shell
v0.5.4Unix shell + filesystem worker — exec with denylist/timeout/output caps and background jobs; fs::ls|stat|mkdir|rm|chmod|mv|grep|sed|read|write with host jail, denylist, size caps, and sandbox-target forwarding
- macOS: arm64 · x64
- Linux: arm64 · armv7 · x64
exact versions are immutable; binary and bundle artifacts are digest-pinned.
full markdown
/workers/shell.md?version=0.5.4. paste it into an llm prompt or pipe it through curl from a worker.install
configuration
- allowed_env:
- PATH
- HOME
- LANG
- LC_ALL
- TERM
allowlist:
default_timeout_ms: 10000
denylist_patterns:
- rm\s+-rf\s+/
- :\(\)\s*\{\s*:\|
- mkfs
- dd\s+if=
- shutdown
- reboot
- /etc/shadow
fs:
allow_unjailed: false
denylist_paths:
- /etc/passwd
- /etc/shadow
host_root: /tmp
max_read_bytes: 16777216
max_write_bytes: 16777216
inherit_env: true
job_retention_secs: 3600
max_bg_timeout_ms: 0
max_concurrent_jobs: 16
max_output_bytes: 1048576
max_timeout_ms: 120000
sandbox:
enabled: true
working_dir: nulldependencies
readme
shell
Run allowlisted Unix commands, background jobs, and structured filesystem operations from the iii engine, on the host or forwarded into a sandbox microVM.
Install
iii worker add shellSandbox-targeted execution and shell::fs::* forwarding need the iii-sandbox worker; iii worker add shell does not pull it in. To surface shell::* to LLM agents, pair with iii-directory:
iii worker add iii-sandbox
iii worker add iii-directorySkills
Install the shell agent skill for Claude Code, Cursor, and 30+ other agents:
npx skills add iii-hq/workers --skill shellBrowse or install every worker skill at once:
npx skills add iii-hq/workers --list
npx skills add iii-hq/workers --allConfigure
Settings are managed through the central configuration worker. On boot, the shell worker registers its schema (id shell) and fetches the live value over RPC — that live value is the authoritative config, not a local file. The optional --config flag (default ./config.yaml) provides the initial_value sent on first registration only; once registered, subsequent boots pull the stored value from the configuration worker. When the config changes, the worker hot-reloads the security policy and fs backend automatically (see Hot-reload).
The worker refuses to start unless fs.host_root is set, or fs.allow_unjailed: true is explicitly opted in, because an unset root exposes the whole host filesystem behind only the advisory denylist.
By default, mkdir/chmod/write reject modes carrying setuid/setgid/sticky bits (the top octal digit, e.g. 4755) with S210, since they are a privilege-escalation primitive when the worker runs as root inside the jail. Set fs.allow_special_bits: true only if your workload genuinely needs them.
max_timeout_ms: 120000 # foreground exec hard cap; per-call timeout_ms is clamped to this
max_bg_timeout_ms: 0 # host bg job hard cap in ms; 0 = unbounded (foreground uses max_timeout_ms)
default_timeout_ms: 10000 # applied when the caller omits timeout_ms
max_output_bytes: 1048576 # 1 MiB; stdout/stderr past this set *_truncated
inherit_env: true # forward the worker's env to children; per-call dangerous keys still blocked
allowed_env: [PATH, HOME, LANG, LC_ALL, TERM] # gates per-call `env` (dangerous keys never settable)
# exec gate. argv[0] is matched by basename or exact path; an empty
# allowlist means OPEN — the shipped default, so any command runs.
# denylist_patterns are advisory regex over argv.join(" "), a tripwire for
# catastrophic mistakes only, NOT a security boundary.
allowlist: []
denylist_patterns:
- "rm\\s+-rf\\s+/"
- "mkfs"
- "dd\\s+if="
max_concurrent_jobs: 16 # exec_bg past this is rejected
job_retention_secs: 3600 # finished jobs pruned after this
fs:
host_root: /tmp # jail root for shell::fs::*; required (see above)
allow_unjailed: false # opt-in to running with host_root unset
max_read_bytes: 16777216 # 0 = unlimited
max_write_bytes: 16777216 # 0 = unlimited
denylist_paths: [/etc/passwd, /etc/shadow]
allow_special_bits: false # permit setuid/setgid/sticky bits in mode (default false)
sandbox:
enabled: true # false -> every target: sandbox call returns S210Zero-config default
With no --config file and no value stored in the configuration worker, the worker seeds a built-in default on first registration — so it boots with nothing configured (database-style). That built-in default is the shipped config.yaml: jailed to /tmp, env forwarded, open exec with a catastrophic-only denylist (kept in sync by a unit test). If the stored value is later nulled, the worker does not silently fall back to this seed: boot fails closed and a hot-reload keeps the last-good config. A config that is present but leaves fs.host_root unset (without fs.allow_unjailed: true) also fails closed.
Host shell::exec is not a security boundary: any allowlisted interpreter (sh, node, python3) can construct a denylisted token at runtime and bypass the regex. Run untrusted input with target: { kind: "sandbox", sandbox_id }, which forwards through the iii-sandbox microVM. The allowlist and denylist still apply on top of either backend.
Per-call cwd, env, and stdin (host target)
shell::exec and shell::exec_bg each accept optional fields so an agent can scope a single command to a directory, set specific env values, and feed it standard input without wrapping everything in sh -lc (which would defeat the argv allowlist):
cwd(string): the working directory for this one call. It is confined to the fs jail exactly likeshell::fs::*paths — jail-relative whenfs.host_rootis set (else absolute), canonicalized, and required to resolve insidehost_rootand missdenylist_paths. Acwdthat escapes the jail returnsS215; one that doesn't exist or isn't a directory returnsS211/S210. Omit it to use the configuredworking_dir(unchanged default).env(object of string→string): per-call environment values. A key may be set only if the operator already listed it inallowed_env, and never for an exec-hijacking key —PATH,IFS,HOME, everyLD_*/DYLD_*variant, and other loader/lookup-path and interpreter startup-file keys (GCONV_PATH,BASH_ENV,ENV,PYTHONSTARTUP,PERL5OPT,RUBYOPT,NODE_OPTIONS, …) are on a hardcoded denylist that wins overallowed_env. Note thatHOMEships in the defaultallowed_envfor the worker's own forwarded env but is not settable per-call. Supplying a key that is not inallowed_env, or any dangerous key, rejects the whole call withS210(the offending key is named and the permitted keys are listed); the env is never silently dropped. A permitted per-call value overrides the value that would otherwise be forwarded for that key. So an agent can doNODE_ENV=testonly if the operator putNODE_ENVinallowed_env, and can never injectPATH,HOME, orLD_PRELOAD.stdin(string): written to the program's standard input, which is then closed (EOF). Use it to feedtee,patch,cat, or any stdin filter instead of a shell heredoc. Omit it and stdin is/dev/null.
All three fields are host-only. The sandbox::exec protocol does not forward cwd/env/stdin, so a sandbox-targeted call that supplies any of them is rejected with S210 rather than silently ignoring it. Omit them and behaviour is identical to prior versions.
Quick start
import { registerWorker } from 'iii-sdk'
const iii = registerWorker(process.env.III_URL ?? 'ws://127.0.0.1:49134')
const result = await iii.trigger({
function_id: 'shell::exec',
payload: { command: 'echo', args: ['hello'] },
})
console.log(result)The example runs on the host. The same payload retargets at a microVM with target: { kind: 'sandbox', sandbox_id: '. The other entry points are shell::exec_bg, shell::status, shell::kill, shell::list, shell::config-status, plus the shell::fs::* family (ls, stat, read, write, grep, sed, mkdir, rm, chmod, mv).
Functions
| Function | Purpose |
|---|---|
shell::exec |
Run an allowlisted command in the foreground; returns stdout, stderr, exit code, and timing. Blocks until exit or timeout. Accepts optional host-only cwd (jail-confined), env (gated by allowed_env + a dangerous-key denylist), and stdin (string piped to the program's stdin, then EOF) — see Per-call cwd, env, and stdin. |
shell::exec_bg |
Spawn an allowlisted command as a background job; returns { job_id, argv } immediately. Host-targeted jobs run until they exit or shell::kill terminates them — unbounded by default, and capped only when the operator sets a positive max_bg_timeout_ms (default 0 = unbounded), after which a runaway job is killed and its status becomes killed. Sandbox jobs honor timeout_ms. Same optional host-only cwd/env/stdin as shell::exec. |
shell::status |
Fetch one job's full record: state, exit code, and captured stdout/stderr. A missing id — one that never existed or aged out past job_retention_secs — returns an S211 ("no such job") error. |
shell::list |
Enumerate current jobs as lightweight summaries; argv, stdout, and stderr are redacted. |
shell::kill |
Terminate a running background job by job_id. Sandbox jobs cannot be hard-killed: the record flips to killed but the in-VM process runs until its timeout_ms (or sandbox::stop). |
shell::config-status |
Report the last hot-reload outcome: last_outcome (applied/rejected), last_error, and rejected_reloads (count since boot). A rejected outcome or non-zero count means a stored config was refused and shell is enforcing an older policy than the central store. Takes no arguments. |
shell::fs::ls |
List a directory's entries with structured metadata. |
shell::fs::stat |
Read one path's metadata (size, mode, symlink flag). |
shell::fs::mkdir |
Create a directory, optionally with missing parents. Returns { created, path, already_existed }. |
shell::fs::rm |
Remove a file or directory, optionally recursive. Returns { removed, path, was_present }. |
shell::fs::chmod |
Change a path's mode, and optionally its uid/gid. Returns { entries_changed, path, recursive }. (Breaking: field renamed from updated to entries_changed.) |
shell::fs::mv |
Rename or move one path within the jail. Returns { moved, src, dst, overwrote }. |
shell::fs::grep |
Recursive regex search across a tree; returns structured matches. Keys are singular include_glob/exclude_glob; the case flag is ignore_case. |
shell::fs::sed |
Regex find-and-replace across one file or many. |
shell::fs::write |
Write a file. Simplest form passes inline string content (host target only): { path, content: "file text" }, with mode (octal, default "0644") and parents: true to create parents. A ContentRef object in content instead streams large/staged payloads through an SDK channel (temp file + atomic rename) and is required for sandbox targets — an inline string on a sandbox target returns S210. Batch form: pass files: [{ path, content, mode?, parents? }, ...] (host, inline per file) to write several files in one call; the response then carries per-file files: [{ path, bytes_written }]. A single-file write leaves files empty and returns { bytes_written, path }. Supplying both single path/content and files returns S210. |
shell::fs::read |
Stream a file's bytes out through an SDK channel. For an inline read on the web surface, use the harness::fs::read_inline wrapper instead. |
Every shell::fs::* call accepts the same optional target as exec, so host and sandbox share one wire shape.
Hot-reload
When the configuration worker pushes an updated config, the shell worker swaps in the new security policy and fs backend atomically. A few things to know:
- Each call executes against one consistent runtime snapshot; there is no mid-call config change.
- Already-running background jobs are not retroactively re-checked when the policy tightens — they continue under the policy that was active when they were spawned.
- A reload that widens the jail (for example, clearing
host_root) succeeds but is logged as a privilege change. - If the incoming config is invalid or unsafe, the worker keeps the last-good runtime and logs an error. The rejection is also surfaced through
shell::config-status(arejectedoutcome with a non-zerorejected_reloadscount), so the divergence between the central store and the policy shell is actually enforcing is detectable instead of silent. Rejections are kept last-good and not retried (re-fetching returns the same bad value), so they will not retry-storm. - At boot the reconcile against the configuration worker is fail-closed: the worker refuses to start (and exposes no functions) if it cannot confirm the authoritative config, so it never serves a possibly stale security policy.
Errors
Returned error bodies carry a stable code field. Allowlist and denylist rejections come back as a plain message (command ', command matches denylist: ) rather than an S-code.
| Code | Meaning |
|---|---|
S200 |
In-VM execution failure on a sandbox target. |
S210 |
Invalid request: non-absolute path, empty command or pattern, bad octal mode, malformed payload, sandbox.enabled: false on a sandbox-targeted call, a cwd that is not a directory, an env key outside allowed_env or in the dangerous-key denylist, cwd/env/stdin supplied on a sandbox target (host-only), an inline string content on a sandbox-targeted shell::fs::write, or both single path/content and files on shell::fs::write. |
S211 |
Path not found (including a cwd that does not exist). |
S212 |
Wrong file type for the operation (for example, a file where a directory was expected). |
S213 |
Path already exists. |
S214 |
Directory not empty (non-recursive rm). |
S215 |
Path (or a per-call cwd) escapes host_root, hits fs.denylist_paths, or permission denied. |
S216 |
Generic shell-internal failure: host spawn error, channel error, or a bad engine response. |
S217 |
Invalid regex passed to grep/sed. |
S218 |
fs.max_read_bytes / fs.max_write_bytes cap exceeded. |
S300 |
Sandbox VM boot failed (needs a virtualization host: Apple Silicon or /dev/kvm). |
Sandbox-forwarded fs::*/exec errors can also surface engine codes verbatim instead of collapsing to S216: S001–S004 (sandbox lifecycle), S100–S102 (image/VM/resource), S300, and S400. Branch on the specific code where relevant; only an unrecognized engine code falls back to S216.
Upgrading to 0.4.0
0.4.0 is a breaking release. Migrating from 0.3.x:
shell::fs::chmodresponse field renamedupdated→entries_changed; readentries_changed. Inbound legacy{ updated }from an older engine still deserializes (serde alias), but new consumers should readentries_changed.mkdir/rm/mvgained structured fields (path/already_existed,path/was_present,src/dst/overwrote) alongside the original boolean. Additive: existing readers ofcreated/removed/movedkeep working.- Configuration moved to the central
configurationworker (database-style) with hot-reload.--configis now a first-boot seed only; the live value from the configuration worker wins once an entry exists.--manifestwas removed (the interface is collected live). - New read-only
shell::config-statusreports the last hot-reload outcome. Operator/automation only; it is denied to agents. - Error envelope: the S-code is now the top-level wire
code. Every S-coded failure returns{ "code": "S211", "message": "no such job: ..." }with the S-code as the top-levelcode. Previously the code was buried — handlers returned the{code,message}JSON stringified intomessageunder the genericinvocation_failedcode. Consumers that branched oncode == "invocation_failed"or parsed the embedded JSON out of the message must update to readerror.codedirectly. - Host background jobs are unbounded by default. A host-targeted
shell::exec_bgjob runs until it exits orshell::killterminates it — long installs, builds, dev-servers, and tails are not killed. To force-kill a runaway host bg job, set a positivemax_bg_timeout_ms(new operator config field, default0= unbounded; separate frommax_timeout_ms, which bounds foregroundshell::exec); a job that exceeds it is killed and its status becomeskilled. Sandbox jobs still honortimeout_ms. - Per-call
envdenylist broadened. The always-rejected key set now includesHOMEand loader/lookup-path keys (LD_*,DYLD_*,GCONV_PATH, …) and interpreter/shell startup-file keys (BASH_ENV,ENV,PYTHONSTARTUP,PERL5OPT,RUBYOPT,NODE_OPTIONS). These are rejected even if listed inallowed_env.LD_*/DYLD_*are matched by family prefix, so a loader variable not in the explicit list is still rejected. Note thatHOMEis in the defaultallowed_envfor the worker's own forwarded env but is not settable per-call. - Sandbox-forwarded fs/exec errors can now surface engine S-codes that 0.3.7 collapsed to
S216— e.g.S001–S004(lifecycle),S100–S102(image/VM),S300, andS400. Branch on the specific code where relevant.
Troubleshooting
fs.host_root is unset ... refusing to start unjailed: setfs.host_rootto a directory, or setfs.allow_unjailed: true.command ': the basename of' not in allowlist argv[0]is not in a non-emptyallowlist. Add it, or empty the list to allow anything.S215 path escapes host_rooton a path inside the jail: a symlink in the path resolves outside the jail. Resolve it yourself, or move the target insidehost_root.S300on a sandbox target: the host cannot boot microVMs. Sandbox execution requires Apple Silicon or/dev/kvm.- Worker never connects: the engine is not running or not bound on the configured
--url. Start the engine first; the default WebSocket port is 49134.
For the threat model, streaming wire shapes, and contributor build steps, see ARCHITECTURE.md.
License
Apache 2.0 — see LICENSE.
api reference (json)
{
"functions": [
{
"description": "Report the last configuration hot-reload outcome: last_outcome (applied|rejected), last_error, and rejected_reloads (count since boot). A rejected outcome or non-zero count means a stored config was refused and shell is enforcing an older policy than the central store. Takes no arguments.",
"metadata": {},
"name": "shell::config-status",
"request_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"description": "`shell::config-status` takes no arguments; this empty struct publishes an accurate (empty-object) request schema, mirroring [`ListRequest`]. The response is `configuration::ReloadStatus`. Like [`ListRequest`], it is NOT `deny_unknown_fields` — the engine-injected `_caller_worker_id` would otherwise be rejected; the handler ignores the payload.",
"title": "ConfigStatusRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"response_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"ReloadOutcome": {
"description": "Outcome of the most recent hot-reload attempt, exposed via `shell::config-status`.",
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "The live runtime reflects the most recent configuration the worker loaded.",
"enum": [
"applied"
],
"type": "string"
},
{
"description": "The most recent configuration:updated delivered a value the worker could NOT build; the previous valid policy is still active and the central store has DIVERGED from what shell is enforcing.",
"enum": [
"rejected"
],
"type": "string"
}
]
}
},
"description": "Operator-visible hot-reload status. `rejected_reloads > 0` (or `last_outcome == Rejected`) means a stored config was refused and shell is enforcing an older policy than the central store — actionable divergence.",
"properties": {
"last_error": {
"description": "Build error from the most recent rejected reload (why it was refused).",
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
},
"last_outcome": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ReloadOutcome"
},
"rejected_reloads": {
"description": "Cumulative count of rejected reloads since boot (never reset).",
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0,
"type": "integer"
}
},
"required": [
"last_outcome",
"rejected_reloads"
],
"title": "ReloadStatus",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "Run an allowlisted command in the foreground and return its full output. Put the program name in `command` (string) and arguments in `args` (string[]) — do NOT pass argv as an array in `command`. `timeout_ms` is capped at the configured max; negative/fractional values fall back to the default. `target` defaults to the host; pass { kind: \"sandbox\", sandbox_id } to run in a microVM. Optional host-only `cwd` scopes this call to a directory (jail-confined exactly like shell::fs::* paths; escaping it is S215), optional `env` (object) sets per-call values — but only for keys already in allowed_env and never for PATH/IFS/HOME/LD_*/DYLD_* or other loader/lookup and interpreter-startup keys (those reject S210) — and optional host-only `stdin` (string) is written to the program's standard input (use it for `tee`, `patch`, or any stdin filter instead of a shell heredoc). cwd/env/stdin on a sandbox target reject S210. Backend errors return { code, message }; common: S216 host exec error, S300 VM boot failed, S200 in-VM failure. argv-parse and allowlist/denylist rejections are plain-string messages naming the violation.",
"metadata": {},
"name": "shell::exec",
"request_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"Target": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"host"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"sandbox"
],
"type": "string"
},
"sandbox_id": {
"format": "uuid",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"sandbox_id"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
}
},
"description": "Wire request for `shell::exec`. The schema is published to the engine's tool listing so callers see field types up front instead of guessing from the description.",
"properties": {
"args": {
"default": null,
"description": "Arguments passed to the program, in order. Every element must be a string; non-string elements are rejected by index. `None` (or `args: null` / absent) means \"tokenize `command` via shell-words\"; `Some(_)` (including the empty vec) means \"use args verbatim, no shell-words.\" See `parse_argv` in `crate::exec::host`.",
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": [
"array",
"null"
]
},
"command": {
"description": "Program name (matched against the allowlist by basename or exact path). Must be a string — split arguments into `args`, do not pass argv as an array here.",
"type": "string"
},
"cwd": {
"default": null,
"description": "Optional working directory for this call (host target only). Confined to the fs jail exactly like `shell::fs::*` paths: jail-relative when `fs.host_root` is set (else absolute), canonicalized, and must resolve inside `host_root` and miss the denylist — a path that escapes returns S215. Must already exist and be a directory. Omit to use the configured `working_dir` (unchanged default). Rejected (S210) on a sandbox target.",
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
},
"env": {
"additionalProperties": {
"type": "string"
},
"default": null,
"description": "Optional per-call environment values (host target only). A key may be set ONLY if the operator listed it in `allowed_env`, and NEVER for an exec-hijacking key (PATH, IFS, HOME, LD_*/DYLD_*, and other loader/lookup and interpreter-startup keys — see DANGEROUS_ENV_KEYS) — those are rejected even if allowlisted. Supplying a key that is not in `allowed_env`, or any dangerous key, rejects the WHOLE call (S210) naming the offending key; the env is never silently dropped. Permitted values override what would otherwise be forwarded for that key. Rejected (S210) on a sandbox target.",
"type": [
"object",
"null"
]
},
"stdin": {
"default": null,
"description": "Optional bytes written to the program's standard input, followed by EOF. Use this to pipe content to a command that reads stdin (`tee`, `patch`, `cat`, a filter) instead of wrapping it in a shell heredoc. Omit to leave stdin closed (`/dev/null`, the default). HOST target only — rejected (S210) on a sandbox target, like cwd/env.",
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
},
"target": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/Target"
}
],
"default": {
"kind": "host"
},
"description": "Where to run the command. Defaults to the host worker; pass `{ kind: \"sandbox\", sandbox_id }` to forward the call to a microVM."
},
"timeout_ms": {
"default": null,
"description": "Per-call timeout override, milliseconds. Capped at `cfg.max_timeout_ms`. Negative or fractional values silently fall back to `cfg.default_timeout_ms` (loose wire semantic, preserved on purpose).",
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0,
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"command"
],
"title": "ExecRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"response_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"properties": {
"duration_ms": {
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0,
"type": "integer"
},
"exit_code": {
"format": "int32",
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
},
"stderr": {
"type": "string"
},
"stderr_truncated": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"stdout": {
"type": "string"
},
"stdout_truncated": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"timed_out": {
"type": "boolean"
}
},
"required": [
"duration_ms",
"stderr",
"stderr_truncated",
"stdout",
"stdout_truncated",
"timed_out"
],
"title": "ExecResponse",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "Spawn an allowlisted command as a background job; returns { job_id, argv } immediately. Same payload as shell::exec (command + args, do NOT pass argv as an array), including the optional host-only `cwd` (jail-confined; escape is S215), `env` (only allowed_env keys, never PATH/IFS/HOME/LD_*/DYLD_* or other loader/lookup and interpreter-startup keys), and `stdin` (string written to the job's stdin); violations and cwd/env/stdin on a sandbox target reject with an S210 message. Poll with shell::status, terminate with shell::kill, list with shell::list. Host background jobs ignore the per-call timeout_ms and run until they exit or shell::kill terminates them; set the operator config `max_bg_timeout_ms` (0 = unbounded, the default) to force-kill a runaway job after that long. Spawn-time failures (argv-parse, allowlist/denylist, cwd/env gating, spawn, concurrency cap) are plain-string messages naming the violation; once spawned, per-job failures surface through shell::status (the job record's status/stderr), not this call's return.",
"metadata": {},
"name": "shell::exec_bg",
"request_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"Target": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"host"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"sandbox"
],
"type": "string"
},
"sandbox_id": {
"format": "uuid",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"sandbox_id"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
}
},
"description": "Wire request for `shell::exec_bg`. Same shape as [`ExecRequest`]; documented separately so the engine publishes a distinct schema per function.",
"properties": {
"args": {
"default": null,
"description": "Arguments passed to the program. See [`ExecRequest::args`]. `None` (or `args: null` / absent) means \"tokenize `command` via shell-words\"; `Some(_)` (including the empty vec) means \"use args verbatim, no shell-words.\" See `parse_argv` in `crate::exec::host`.",
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": [
"array",
"null"
]
},
"command": {
"description": "Program name. See [`ExecRequest::command`].",
"type": "string"
},
"cwd": {
"default": null,
"description": "Optional working directory for this job (host target only). Same jail confinement and rules as [`ExecRequest::cwd`]: canonicalized, must resolve inside `host_root` (S215 on escape) and be an existing directory. Rejected (S210) on a sandbox target.",
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
},
"env": {
"additionalProperties": {
"type": "string"
},
"default": null,
"description": "Optional per-call environment values (host target only). Same gating as [`ExecRequest::env`]: a key must be in `allowed_env` and must not be an exec-hijacking key (PATH, IFS, HOME, LD_*/DYLD_*, and other loader/lookup and interpreter-startup keys — see DANGEROUS_ENV_KEYS); any violation rejects the whole call (S210). Rejected (S210) on a sandbox target.",
"type": [
"object",
"null"
]
},
"stdin": {
"default": null,
"description": "Optional bytes written to the job's standard input, then EOF. See [`ExecRequest::stdin`]. HOST target only — rejected (S210) on a sandbox target.",
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
},
"target": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/Target"
}
],
"default": {
"kind": "host"
},
"description": "Where to run. See [`ExecRequest::target`]."
},
"timeout_ms": {
"default": null,
"description": "Per-call timeout. Host-targeted background jobs IGNORE `timeout_ms`; sandbox-targeted ones forward it through `cfg.resolve_timeout`.",
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0,
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"command"
],
"title": "ExecBgRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"response_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"properties": {
"argv": {
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": "array"
},
"job_id": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"argv",
"job_id"
],
"title": "ExecBgResponse",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "Change permissions. `mode` is an octal string like \"0644\". `uid`/`gid` optionally chown. `recursive: true` walks the tree (symlinks skipped). Returns { entries_changed, path, recursive }. Errors return { code, message }; common: S210 bad mode, S211 not found, S215 jail/denylist.",
"metadata": {},
"name": "shell::fs::chmod",
"request_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"Target": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"host"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"sandbox"
],
"type": "string"
},
"sandbox_id": {
"format": "uuid",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"sandbox_id"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
}
},
"properties": {
"gid": {
"default": null,
"description": "Optional chown to this numeric gid.",
"format": "uint32",
"minimum": 0,
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
},
"mode": {
"description": "Octal permission string, e.g. \"0755\".",
"type": "string"
},
"path": {
"description": "Jail-relative when fs.host_root is set, else absolute.",
"type": "string"
},
"recursive": {
"default": false,
"description": "Apply mode/owner change to all files under the path recursively.",
"type": "boolean"
},
"target": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/Target"
}
],
"default": {
"kind": "host"
},
"description": "host (default) or { kind: \"sandbox\", sandbox_id }."
},
"uid": {
"default": null,
"description": "Optional chown to this numeric uid.",
"format": "uint32",
"minimum": 0,
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"mode",
"path"
],
"title": "ChmodRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"response_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"properties": {
"entries_changed": {
"description": "Number of filesystem entries whose mode/owner changed.",
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0,
"type": "integer"
},
"path": {
"default": "",
"description": "The path that was targeted. Empty for sandbox targets.",
"type": "string"
},
"recursive": {
"default": false,
"description": "Whether the change was applied recursively. Host only.",
"type": "boolean"
}
},
"required": [
"entries_changed"
],
"title": "ChmodResponse",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "Search file contents. `pattern` is a Rust regex (RE2-like). `recursive` defaults true. `include_glob`/`exclude_glob` filter paths. Returns { matches, truncated }. Errors return { code, message }; common: S217 bad regex, S215 jail/denylist.",
"metadata": {},
"name": "shell::fs::grep",
"request_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"Target": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"host"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"sandbox"
],
"type": "string"
},
"sandbox_id": {
"format": "uuid",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"sandbox_id"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
}
},
"properties": {
"exclude_glob": {
"default": [],
"description": "Glob filters excluding file paths from the search.",
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": "array"
},
"ignore_case": {
"default": false,
"description": "Match pattern case-insensitively.",
"type": "boolean"
},
"include_glob": {
"default": [],
"description": "Glob filters restricting which file paths are searched.",
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": "array"
},
"max_line_bytes": {
"default": 4096,
"description": "Skip lines longer than this many bytes (default 4 096).",
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0,
"type": "integer"
},
"max_matches": {
"default": 10000,
"description": "Stop collecting matches after this many results (default 10 000).",
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0,
"type": "integer"
},
"path": {
"description": "Jail-relative when fs.host_root is set, else absolute.",
"type": "string"
},
"pattern": {
"description": "Rust regex (RE2-like) matched against each line.",
"type": "string"
},
"recursive": {
"default": true,
"description": "Descend into subdirectories (default true).",
"type": "boolean"
},
"target": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/Target"
}
],
"default": {
"kind": "host"
},
"description": "host (default) or { kind: \"sandbox\", sandbox_id }."
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"pattern"
],
"title": "GrepRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"response_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"FsMatch": {
"properties": {
"content": {
"type": "string"
},
"line": {
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0,
"type": "integer"
},
"path": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"content",
"line",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
}
},
"properties": {
"matches": {
"description": "All collected match locations up to `max_matches`.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FsMatch"
},
"type": "array"
},
"truncated": {
"description": "True when the result was capped by `max_matches` or `max_line_bytes`.",
"type": "boolean"
}
},
"required": [
"matches",
"truncated"
],
"title": "GrepResponse",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "List directory contents. `path` is relative to the configured fs jail root (fs.host_root) when set, otherwise absolute. `target` defaults to host; pass { kind: \"sandbox\", sandbox_id } to run in a microVM. Errors return { code, message }; common: S210 bad path, S211 not found, S212 not a directory, S215 jail/denylist.",
"metadata": {},
"name": "shell::fs::ls",
"request_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"Target": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"host"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"sandbox"
],
"type": "string"
},
"sandbox_id": {
"format": "uuid",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"sandbox_id"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
}
},
"properties": {
"path": {
"description": "Jail-relative when fs.host_root is set, else absolute.",
"type": "string"
},
"target": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/Target"
}
],
"default": {
"kind": "host"
},
"description": "host (default) or { kind: \"sandbox\", sandbox_id }."
}
},
"required": [
"path"
],
"title": "LsRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"response_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"FsEntry": {
"properties": {
"is_dir": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"is_symlink": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"mode": {
"type": "string"
},
"mtime": {
"format": "int64",
"type": "integer"
},
"name": {
"type": "string"
},
"size": {
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0,
"type": "integer"
}
},
"required": [
"is_dir",
"is_symlink",
"mode",
"mtime",
"name",
"size"
],
"type": "object"
}
},
"properties": {
"entries": {
"description": "Metadata for each entry in the directory.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FsEntry"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
"entries"
],
"title": "LsResponse",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "Create a directory. `mode` is an octal string like \"0755\". `parents: true` creates missing parents and is idempotent. Returns { created, path, already_existed }. Errors return { code, message }; common: S210 bad mode, S213 exists, S215 jail/denylist.",
"metadata": {},
"name": "shell::fs::mkdir",
"request_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"Target": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"host"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"sandbox"
],
"type": "string"
},
"sandbox_id": {
"format": "uuid",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"sandbox_id"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
}
},
"properties": {
"mode": {
"default": "0755",
"description": "Octal permission string, e.g. \"0755\".",
"type": "string"
},
"parents": {
"default": false,
"description": "Create missing parent directories.",
"type": "boolean"
},
"path": {
"description": "Jail-relative when fs.host_root is set, else absolute.",
"type": "string"
},
"target": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/Target"
}
],
"default": {
"kind": "host"
},
"description": "host (default) or { kind: \"sandbox\", sandbox_id }."
}
},
"required": [
"path"
],
"title": "MkdirRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"response_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"properties": {
"already_existed": {
"default": false,
"description": "True when the path already existed and `parents` was set. Host only; sandbox targets default this to false (not a signal there).",
"type": "boolean"
},
"created": {
"description": "True when a new directory was created; false when it already existed (only possible with `parents: true`, which is idempotent).",
"type": "boolean"
},
"path": {
"default": "",
"description": "The directory path that was targeted. Empty for sandbox targets.",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"created"
],
"title": "MkdirResponse",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "Move/rename a path. `overwrite: true` allows replacing an existing dst. Returns { moved, src, dst, overwrote }. Errors return { code, message }; common: S211 src not found, S213 dst exists, S215 jail/denylist.",
"metadata": {},
"name": "shell::fs::mv",
"request_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"Target": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"host"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"sandbox"
],
"type": "string"
},
"sandbox_id": {
"format": "uuid",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"sandbox_id"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
}
},
"properties": {
"dst": {
"description": "Destination path; jail-relative when fs.host_root is set, else absolute.",
"type": "string"
},
"overwrite": {
"default": false,
"description": "Replace an existing destination instead of returning an error.",
"type": "boolean"
},
"src": {
"description": "Source path; jail-relative when fs.host_root is set, else absolute.",
"type": "string"
},
"target": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/Target"
}
],
"default": {
"kind": "host"
},
"description": "host (default) or { kind: \"sandbox\", sandbox_id }."
}
},
"required": [
"dst",
"src"
],
"title": "MvRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"response_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"properties": {
"dst": {
"default": "",
"description": "Destination path. Empty for sandbox targets.",
"type": "string"
},
"moved": {
"description": "True when the move/rename succeeded.",
"type": "boolean"
},
"overwrote": {
"default": false,
"description": "True when an existing destination was overwritten. Host only (sandbox targets default this to false, not a signal there). Best-effort: derived from a pre-rename existence check, so under a concurrent writer racing the destination it may under-report (and an `overwrite:false` move can still replace a file created in that window).",
"type": "boolean"
},
"src": {
"default": "",
"description": "Source path. Empty for sandbox targets.",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"moved"
],
"title": "MvResponse",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "Stream a file from a path. Returns a ContentRef the caller reads from, plus size/mode/mtime. Errors return { code, message }; common: S211 not found, S212 path is a directory, S215 jail/denylist, S218 file exceeds max_read_bytes, S216 channel/IO error.",
"metadata": {},
"name": "shell::fs::read",
"request_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"Target": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"host"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"sandbox"
],
"type": "string"
},
"sandbox_id": {
"format": "uuid",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"sandbox_id"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
}
},
"properties": {
"path": {
"description": "Jail-relative when fs.host_root is set, else absolute.",
"type": "string"
},
"target": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/Target"
}
],
"default": {
"kind": "host"
},
"description": "host (default) or { kind: \"sandbox\", sandbox_id }."
}
},
"required": [
"path"
],
"title": "ReadRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"response_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"ContentDirection": {
"enum": [
"read",
"write"
],
"type": "string"
},
"ContentRef": {
"description": "Wire-identical mirror of `iii_sdk::channels::StreamChannelRef`. The SDK type lacks `JsonSchema` in 0.11.3, which would block typed registration of `shell::fs::write`/`read`.",
"properties": {
"access_key": {
"description": "Secret key that authorises access to this channel.",
"type": "string"
},
"channel_id": {
"description": "Opaque identifier for the open stream channel.",
"type": "string"
},
"direction": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/ContentDirection"
}
],
"default": "read",
"description": "Direction of data flow: \"read\" (consume) or \"write\" (produce)."
}
},
"required": [
"access_key",
"channel_id"
],
"type": "object"
}
},
"properties": {
"content": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/ContentRef"
}
],
"description": "Channel reference for streaming the file content back to the caller."
},
"mode": {
"description": "Octal permission string of the file, e.g. \"0644\".",
"type": "string"
},
"mtime": {
"description": "Last-modified time as a Unix timestamp (seconds).",
"format": "int64",
"type": "integer"
},
"size": {
"description": "File size in bytes at the time of the read.",
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0,
"type": "integer"
}
},
"required": [
"content",
"mode",
"mtime",
"size"
],
"title": "ReadResponseWire",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "Remove a path. `recursive: true` is required to delete a non-empty directory. Returns { removed, path, was_present }. Errors return { code, message }; common: S211 not found, S214 dir not empty (pass recursive), S215 jail/denylist.",
"metadata": {},
"name": "shell::fs::rm",
"request_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"Target": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"host"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"sandbox"
],
"type": "string"
},
"sandbox_id": {
"format": "uuid",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"sandbox_id"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
}
},
"properties": {
"path": {
"description": "Jail-relative when fs.host_root is set, else absolute.",
"type": "string"
},
"recursive": {
"default": false,
"description": "Required to delete a non-empty directory.",
"type": "boolean"
},
"target": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/Target"
}
],
"default": {
"kind": "host"
},
"description": "host (default) or { kind: \"sandbox\", sandbox_id }."
}
},
"required": [
"path"
],
"title": "RmRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"response_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"properties": {
"path": {
"default": "",
"description": "The path that was targeted. Empty for sandbox targets.",
"type": "string"
},
"removed": {
"description": "True when the path was removed.",
"type": "boolean"
},
"was_present": {
"default": false,
"description": "True when the path existed before removal. Host only; sandbox targets default this to false, which does NOT mean the path was absent.",
"type": "boolean"
}
},
"required": [
"removed"
],
"title": "RmResponse",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "Find-and-replace across files. `pattern` is a Rust regex by default (set regex:false for a literal). Provide either `files` (explicit list) or `path` (+ recursive). Returns { results, total_replacements }. Errors return { code, message }; common: S217 bad regex, S211 not found, S215 jail/denylist.",
"metadata": {},
"name": "shell::fs::sed",
"request_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"Target": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"host"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"sandbox"
],
"type": "string"
},
"sandbox_id": {
"format": "uuid",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"sandbox_id"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
}
},
"properties": {
"exclude_glob": {
"default": [],
"description": "Glob filters excluding file paths from editing.",
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": "array"
},
"files": {
"default": [],
"description": "Explicit list of file paths to edit; provide either this or `path`, not both.",
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": "array"
},
"first_only": {
"default": false,
"description": "Replace only the first match per file instead of all matches.",
"type": "boolean"
},
"ignore_case": {
"default": false,
"description": "Match pattern case-insensitively.",
"type": "boolean"
},
"include_glob": {
"default": [],
"description": "Glob filters restricting which file paths are edited.",
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": "array"
},
"path": {
"default": null,
"description": "Root path to walk for files; used with `recursive`, `include_glob`, `exclude_glob`.",
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
},
"pattern": {
"description": "Rust regex by default; set regex:false for a literal string.",
"type": "string"
},
"recursive": {
"default": true,
"description": "Descend into subdirectories when `path` is set (default true).",
"type": "boolean"
},
"regex": {
"default": true,
"description": "Treat pattern as a regex (default true) or a literal string (false).",
"type": "boolean"
},
"replacement": {
"description": "String to substitute for each match.",
"type": "string"
},
"target": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/Target"
}
],
"default": {
"kind": "host"
},
"description": "host (default) or { kind: \"sandbox\", sandbox_id }."
}
},
"required": [
"pattern",
"replacement"
],
"title": "SedRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"response_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"FsSedFileResult": {
"properties": {
"error": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
},
"path": {
"type": "string"
},
"replacements": {
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0,
"type": "integer"
},
"success": {
"type": "boolean"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"replacements",
"success"
],
"type": "object"
}
},
"properties": {
"results": {
"description": "Per-file replacement details.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FsSedFileResult"
},
"type": "array"
},
"total_replacements": {
"description": "Sum of replacements made across all files.",
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0,
"type": "integer"
}
},
"required": [
"results",
"total_replacements"
],
"title": "SedResponse",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "Stat a single path (jail-relative when fs.host_root is set). Returns the entry's type, size, mode, and mtime. Errors return { code, message }; common: S211 not found, S215 jail/denylist.",
"metadata": {},
"name": "shell::fs::stat",
"request_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"Target": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"host"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"sandbox"
],
"type": "string"
},
"sandbox_id": {
"format": "uuid",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"sandbox_id"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
}
},
"properties": {
"path": {
"description": "Jail-relative when fs.host_root is set, else absolute.",
"type": "string"
},
"target": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/Target"
}
],
"default": {
"kind": "host"
},
"description": "host (default) or { kind: \"sandbox\", sandbox_id }."
}
},
"required": [
"path"
],
"title": "StatRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"response_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"properties": {
"is_dir": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"is_symlink": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"mode": {
"type": "string"
},
"mtime": {
"format": "int64",
"type": "integer"
},
"name": {
"type": "string"
},
"size": {
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0,
"type": "integer"
}
},
"required": [
"is_dir",
"is_symlink",
"mode",
"mtime",
"name",
"size"
],
"title": "FsEntry",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "Write a file. Simplest form: { path, content: \"text\" } — `content` as a plain STRING is written inline (host target only), no streaming channel needed. For large/streamed payloads or a sandbox target, pass `content` as a ContentRef { channel_id, access_key, direction } from a write stream channel you opened through the engine's streaming layer (inline strings reject S210 on a sandbox target). To write several files at once, pass `files: [{ path, content, mode?, parents? }, ...]` instead of the single-file fields (host target, inline content) — the response then carries per-file results in `files`. `mode` is octal (default \"0644\"); `parents: true` creates missing parents. Errors return { code, message }; common: S210 bad mode/payload or inline-on-sandbox, S215 jail/denylist, S218 payload exceeds max_write_bytes, S216 channel/IO error.",
"metadata": {},
"name": "shell::fs::write",
"request_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"ContentDirection": {
"enum": [
"read",
"write"
],
"type": "string"
},
"ContentRef": {
"description": "Wire-identical mirror of `iii_sdk::channels::StreamChannelRef`. The SDK type lacks `JsonSchema` in 0.11.3, which would block typed registration of `shell::fs::write`/`read`.",
"properties": {
"access_key": {
"description": "Secret key that authorises access to this channel.",
"type": "string"
},
"channel_id": {
"description": "Opaque identifier for the open stream channel.",
"type": "string"
},
"direction": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/ContentDirection"
}
],
"default": "read",
"description": "Direction of data flow: \"read\" (consume) or \"write\" (produce)."
}
},
"required": [
"access_key",
"channel_id"
],
"type": "object"
},
"Target": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"host"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"sandbox"
],
"type": "string"
},
"sandbox_id": {
"format": "uuid",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"sandbox_id"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"WriteContentWire": {
"anyOf": [
{
"description": "Inline UTF-8 text, written verbatim. HOST target only.",
"type": "string"
},
{
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/ContentRef"
}
],
"description": "Open write-stream channel ref. Required for sandbox targets and large or streamed payloads."
}
],
"description": "Wire form of write content. A plain JSON **string** is written inline (host target only); a JSON **object** is a streaming `ContentRef` (host or sandbox, for large/streamed payloads). Untagged, so callers just pass `\"content\": \"text\"` or `\"content\": { channel_id, access_key, direction }`."
},
"WriteFileSpec": {
"description": "One file in a batch `shell::fs::write` (`files: [...]`).",
"properties": {
"content": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/WriteContentWire"
}
],
"description": "Inline string (recommended) or a streaming ContentRef."
},
"mode": {
"default": "0644",
"description": "Octal permission string, e.g. \"0644\".",
"type": "string"
},
"parents": {
"default": false,
"description": "Create missing parent directories.",
"type": "boolean"
},
"path": {
"description": "Jail-relative when fs.host_root is set, else absolute.",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"content",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
}
},
"properties": {
"content": {
"anyOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/WriteContentWire"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Single-file content: a plain string written inline (host target only), OR a ContentRef { channel_id, access_key, direction } for an open write stream channel. Omit when using `files`."
},
"files": {
"description": "Batch form: write several files in one call. When present, the single-file fields (`path`/`content`/`mode`/`parents`) must be omitted.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/WriteFileSpec"
},
"type": [
"array",
"null"
]
},
"mode": {
"default": null,
"description": "Octal permission string for the single-file form, e.g. \"0644\". `Option` (not a defaulted `String`) so the batch-form check can tell \"caller omitted mode\" from \"caller sent a mode\" and reject the latter instead of silently dropping it. Defaults to \"0644\" in the single-file path. Omit when using `files` (each entry carries its own `mode`).",
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
},
"parents": {
"default": null,
"description": "Create missing parent directories (single-file form). `Option` for the same reason as `mode` — so a top-level `parents` sent alongside `files` is rejected, not ignored. Defaults to `false`. Omit when using `files`.",
"type": [
"boolean",
"null"
]
},
"path": {
"default": null,
"description": "Single-file form: the path to write. Jail-relative when fs.host_root is set, else absolute. Omit when using `files`.",
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
},
"target": {
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/Target"
}
],
"default": {
"kind": "host"
},
"description": "host (default) or { kind: \"sandbox\", sandbox_id }."
}
},
"title": "WriteRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"response_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"WriteFileResult": {
"properties": {
"bytes_written": {
"description": "Bytes written to this file.",
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0,
"type": "integer"
},
"path": {
"description": "Path of the written file.",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"bytes_written",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
}
},
"properties": {
"bytes_written": {
"description": "Bytes written: this file for a single write; the sum across `files` for a batch write.",
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0,
"type": "integer"
},
"files": {
"default": [],
"description": "Per-file results for a batch (`files: [...]`) write; empty for a single-file write.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/WriteFileResult"
},
"type": "array"
},
"path": {
"description": "Path written for a single write; empty for a batch (see `files`).",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"bytes_written",
"path"
],
"title": "WriteResponse",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "Terminate a running background job by job_id (the UUID from shell::exec_bg). Errors return { code, message }; common: S211 no such job, S216 kill/signal delivery failure.",
"metadata": {},
"name": "shell::kill",
"request_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"properties": {
"job_id": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"job_id"
],
"title": "KillRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"response_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"JobStatus": {
"enum": [
"running",
"finished",
"killed",
"failed"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"properties": {
"job_id": {
"type": "string"
},
"killed": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"reason": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
},
"status": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/JobStatus"
}
},
"required": [
"job_id",
"killed",
"status"
],
"title": "KillResponse",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "List background jobs (running + recently completed). Takes no arguments.",
"metadata": {},
"name": "shell::list",
"request_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"description": "`shell::list` takes no arguments; this empty struct publishes an accurate (empty-object) request schema.\n\nNOTE: deliberately NOT `#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]`. The engine injects a `_caller_worker_id` field into every call's payload, so a strict no-arg struct would reject EVERY call. The handler ignores the payload entirely (`move |_req: Value|` in main.rs) for the same reason.",
"title": "ListRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"response_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"JobStatus": {
"enum": [
"running",
"finished",
"killed",
"failed"
],
"type": "string"
},
"JobSummary": {
"description": "`shell::list` returns one `JobSummary` per record. argv, stdout, and stderr are deliberately omitted: the global JOBS map is process-wide and has no per-caller scope, so any caller could otherwise read every other caller's command line and captured output (which may embed credentials). Full records remain reachable via `shell::status <job_id>` — the random UUID acts as an unguessable capability for that record.",
"properties": {
"exit_code": {
"format": "int32",
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
},
"finished_at_ms": {
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0,
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
},
"id": {
"type": "string"
},
"started_at_ms": {
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0,
"type": "integer"
},
"status": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/JobStatus"
},
"stderr_truncated": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"stdout_truncated": {
"type": "boolean"
}
},
"required": [
"id",
"started_at_ms",
"status",
"stderr_truncated",
"stdout_truncated"
],
"type": "object"
}
},
"properties": {
"count": {
"format": "uint",
"minimum": 0,
"type": "integer"
},
"jobs": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/JobSummary"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
"count",
"jobs"
],
"title": "ListResponse",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "Internal: reload the security policy + fs backend on configuration change.",
"metadata": {},
"name": "shell::on-config-change",
"request_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"description": "Event delivered to the internal `shell::on-config-change` handler. A struct (not `Value`) keeps the request schema concrete; the handler re-fetches the configuration id; unknown fields are ignored.",
"properties": {
"id": {
"default": null,
"description": "Configuration id that changed (advisory; the handler re-fetches the value). Schema-only: kept to publish a typed request schema; the handler ignores it.",
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"title": "OnConfigChangeEvent",
"type": "object"
},
"response_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"description": "Ack returned by the internal `shell::on-config-change` handler.",
"properties": {
"ok": {
"type": "boolean"
}
},
"required": [
"ok"
],
"title": "OnConfigChangeResponse",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "Fetch the full record (status, exit_code, timing) of a background job by job_id. Errors return { code, message }; common: S211 no such job.",
"metadata": {},
"name": "shell::status",
"request_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"properties": {
"job_id": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"job_id"
],
"title": "StatusRequest",
"type": "object"
},
"response_schema": {
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"definitions": {
"JobRecord": {
"properties": {
"argv": {
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": "array"
},
"exit_code": {
"format": "int32",
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
},
"finished_at_ms": {
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0,
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
},
"id": {
"type": "string"
},
"started_at_ms": {
"format": "uint64",
"minimum": 0,
"type": "integer"
},
"status": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/JobStatus"
},
"stderr": {
"type": "string"
},
"stderr_truncated": {
"type": "boolean"
},
"stdout": {
"type": "string"
},
"stdout_truncated": {
"type": "boolean"
}
},
"required": [
"argv",
"id",
"started_at_ms",
"status",
"stderr",
"stderr_truncated",
"stdout",
"stdout_truncated"
],
"type": "object"
},
"JobStatus": {
"enum": [
"running",
"finished",
"killed",
"failed"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"properties": {
"job": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/JobRecord"
}
},
"required": [
"job"
],
"title": "StatusResponse",
"type": "object"
}
}
],
"triggers": []
}